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ARGUMENT
I.

THE APRIL 16TH AGREEMENT SHOULD BE ENFORCED BECAUSE
PLAINTIFFS EXECUTION OF THE AGREEMENT WAS NOT
PROCEDURALLY UNCONSCIONABLE.
Throughout the proceedings in the trial court and in Plaintiffs brief, Plaintiff

asserts that "[section] 78B-3-421(l)(c)'s verbal encouragement provision must be
enforced according to its terms" and that this Court "should rule that an arbitration
agreement is not 'validly executed' if the health care provider failed to 'verbally
encourage../"(PL's Br. at p. 13). As before the trial court, Plaintiff asserts a strict
application of the statute and avoids an analysis of whether any failure to "verbally
encourage" her to ask questions rendered the Agreement procedurally unconscionable.
Indeed, Plaintiff asserts that "the trial court did not even rule on appellee's defense that
the arbitration agreement is [not] invalid due to unconscionability" (PL's Br. at p. 21).
Despite Plaintiffs efforts, however, she ultimately acknowledges that the purpose
of section 78B-3-421(l) is to impose "detailed requirements that protect patients from
unconscionable arbitration agreements." (Id. at p. 24) (emphasis original). Dr. Bova
could not agree more. The plain underlying purpose of the requirements set forth in
section 78B-3-421(l) is to ensure that patients who execute arbitration agreements with
their physicians understand the terms of those agreements. Accordingly, if a patient
acknowledges that she understands the terms of an arbitration agreement, that agreement

1

should be enforced because the underlying purpose of the statute has been satisfied. See
State v. Miller, 2008 UT 61, % 18, 193 P.3d 92 (stating rules of statutory interpretation
"require the court to give effect to the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the
statute was meant to achieve").
Glaringly absent from the trial court record and Plaintiffs brief is any explanation
of how the alleged failure to verbally encourage her to ask questions about the Agreement
compromised her ability to understand the terms of the Agreement. (See R.; PL's Br.)
Indeed, Plaintiff has failed to identify a single question that she could have, or would
have asked if she were verbally encouraged to do so, or how the answer to that question
would have caused her to not sign the Agreement. (See id.) Plaintiff attempts to side-step
this deficiency by imploring this Court to ignore the underlying purpose of the statute and
myopically conclude that Dr. Bova's inability to "prove" that he met the verbal
encouragement requirement of section 78B-3-421(l)(c) trumps the Agreement's
compliance with every other requirement of the statute and Plaintiffs undisputed
acknowledgments that she understood the terms of the Agreement. (See PL's Br. at pp.
12-18). Of course, the only way Plaintiffs argument works is if the Court ignores wellestablished precedent on the application of the parol evidence rule prohibiting exactly
what the trial court did in this case: considering the extrinsic evidence of Plaintiff s
declarations to contradict her acknowledgments that she understood the terms of the
Agreement or, alternatively, expand the permissible use of extrinsic evidence to establish

2

procedural unconscionability. (See PL's Br. at pp. 18-21). This Court should reject
Plaintiffs overtures to suspend reason, and hold that Plaintiffs undisputed
acknowledgments demonstrate that the underlying purpose of section 78B-3-421(l) has
been satisfied.
A,

Plaintiffs Undisputed Acknowledgments That She Understood the
Terms of the April 16th Agreement, and the Circumstances
Surrounding Her Execution of the Agreement, Belie Her Claim of
Procedural Unconscionability.

Plaintiff attempts to avoid having her arguments characterized under the doctrine
of procedural unconscionability ostensibly because she realizes that she cannot meet her
heavy burden to demonstrate that her execution of the Agreement was procedurally
unconscionable. Plaintiffs acknowledgment, however, that the underlying purpose of the
requirements set forth in section 78B-3-421(l) is to "protect patients from unconscionable
agreements5' reveals what Dr. Bova has contended all along: the basis of Plaintiff s
argument—and the trial court's decision—is rooted in the doctrine of procedural
unconscionability. Accordingly, the correct inquiry is not just whether one of several
statutory requirements was not met, but whether the execution of the Agreement was
procedurally unconscionable.
Factors bearing on procedural unconscionability include:
(1) whether each party had a reasonable opportunity to
understand the terms and conditions of the agreement; (2)
whether there was a lack of opportunity for meaningful
negotiation; (3) whether the agreement was printed on a
duplicate or boilerplate form drafted solely by the party in the
3

strongest bargaining position; (4) whether the terms of the
agreement were explained to the weaker party; (5) whether
the aggrieved party had a meaningful choice to accept the
terms of the agreement; and (6) whether the stronger party
employed deceptive practices to obscure key contractual
provisions.
Ryan v. Dan Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 403 (Utah 1998). None of these factors is
dispositive. Id. Rather, this Court should "consider all of the circumstances in light of
the doctrine's purpose to prevent oppression and unfair surprise." Id. Conspicuously
absent from Plaintiffs brief is an analysis of these well-established factors. {See PL's
Br.) That is not surprising since Plaintiff did not experience oppression or unfair surprise.
Foremost, it remains undisputed that Plaintiff acknowledged that she understood
the terms of the Agreement. {See PL's Br.; Addendum B to Dr. Bova's Opening Brief at
Art. 9). Plaintiff expressly acknowledged:
I have received a written explanation of the terms of this
Agreement. I have had the right to ask questions and have my
questions answered. I understand that any Claims I might
have must be resolved through the dispute resolution process
in this Agreement instead of having them heard by a judge or
jury. I understand the role of the arbitrators and the manner in
which they are selected. I understand the responsibility for
arbitration related costs. I understand that this Agreement
renews each year unless cancelled before the renewal date. I
understand that I can decline to enter into the Agreement and
still receive health care. I understand that I can rescind this
Agreement within 10 days of signing it.
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(Addendum B at Art. 9). Plaintiffs acknowledgments that she received a written
explanation of the terms of the Agreement, that she understood her claims would be
arbitrated, and understood the role of the arbitrators and how they would be selected not
only demonstrate that Plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms and
conditions of the Agreement, but that she did, in fact, understand its terms. See Ryan, 972
P.2d at 403. Plaintiffs claim of procedural unconscionability is hollow for this reason
alone.
In addition, Plaintiffs undisputed acknowledgments that she knew she could
decline to enter the Agreement and still receive care, and that she could rescind the
Agreement within ten days of signing it (Addendum B at Art. 9), demonstrate that
Plaintiff had a meaningful choice to accept the terms of the Agreement. Moreover,
Plaintiffs undisputed acknowledgment that she received a written explanation of the
terms of the Agreement and had the opportunity to ask questions and have those questions
answered (Addendum B at Art. 9) demonstrate that the terms of the Agreement were
explained to her. Fundamentally, if this Court is to give any weight at all to Plaintiffs
acknowledgments, the only rational conclusion is that Plaintiffs claim of procedural
unconscionability is without merit because Plaintiff understood what she was signing.
This conclusion is further buttressed by the circumstances surrounding Plaintiffs
execution of the Agreement. It remains undisputed that Plaintiff executed an identical
Agreement a day later {i.e., the April 17th Agreement attached to Dr. Bova's Opening Br.
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at Addendum C).1 The April 17th Agreement contains all of the same acknowledgments
as the April 16th Agreement, and provided Plaintiff with yet another opportunity to
understand the terms of the April 16th Agreement, and to rescind it if she did not agree to
its terms. {See Addendum C). Moreover, the presence of Plaintiff s daughter at the time
she executed the April 16th Agreement—a nurse who is familiar with physician/patient
arbitration agreements—also supports the conclusion that Plaintiff had a meaningful
opportunity to understand the Agreement's terms. [R. 29]. Plaintiffs claim that the
execution of the Agreement was rendered procedurally unconscionable by Dr. Bova's
alleged failure to meet only one of several statutory requirements is specious in light of
her own undisputed acknowledgments, the presence of her daughter when she executed
the Agreement, and the undisputed fact that she signed an identical agreement a day later.
B.

Any Alleged Failure to Verbally Encourage Plaintiff to Ask Questions
About the Agreement is Negated By Plaintiffs Failure to Identify a
Single Question She Would Have Asked Had She Been Verbally
Encouraged to Do So.

The purpose of the "verbally encourage"' requirement's purpose derives from a
patient having questions about an arbitration agreement that she needs answered so that
she may understand what she is signing. Thus, Plaintiffs assertion that Dr. Bova's

1

Interestingly, Plaintiff never mentions the April 17 Agreement in her brief.
(See Pl/s Br.) Plaintiffs execution of an identical arbitration agreement a day later belies
her contention that her understanding of those agreements was compromised by Dr.
Bova's failure to "verbally encourage** her to ask questions about the April 16th
Agreement.
6

failure to verbally encourage her to ask questions about the Agreement necessarily leads
to a threshold inquiry of what specific question or questions Plaintiff needed to ask to
improve her understanding of what she was signing. Throughout the trial court
proceedings and Plaintiffs brief, however, Plaintiff has failed to identify a single
question that she would have asked if she were verbally encouraged to do so, or how such
question would bear on the decision to agree to arbitration. (See R.; Pl/s Br.) Plaintiffs
inability to identify any questions she needed to ask to improve her understanding of the
Agreement leads to Plaintiffs corresponding inability to explain to this Court how failing
to satisfy the verbally encouraged requirement compromised Plaintiffs ability to
understand what she was signing. (See id.) The absence of any such explanation is fatal
to Plaintiffs underlying claim of procedural unconscionability.
Further, it is undisputed that Plaintiff "had the right to ask questions and have my
questions answered." (Addendum B at Art. 9). Accordingly, the underlying purpose of
the "verbally encourage" requirement was satisfied because Plaintiff knew she could ask
questions about the Agreement if she had any, regardless of whether she was verbally
encouraged to do so. C.f. R&R Indus. Park, L.L.C. v. Utah Property and Cas. Ins. Guar.
Ass % 2008 UT 80, % 36. 199 P.3d 917 (holding that specific statutory language should
not be interpreted in a manner that would "undermine the purpose of the statute").
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Indeed, whether Plaintiff was verbally encouraged to ask questions or not is
rendered irrelevant in light of the undisputed facts: (1) the Agreement contains all of the
information the legislature required to be communicated to her about arbitration {compare
Addendum B with § 78B-3-421(l)(a) and (b)); and (2) Plaintiff knew she could ask
questions about that information if she had any. Plaintiffs argument—and the trial
court's ruling—boils down to a semantical, rather than a substantive difference between a
patient knowing that she can ask questions about an agreement and being "verbally
encouraged" to ask questions about an agreement; especially when she has no questions
to ask. Contrary to Plaintiffs urging, this Court should not base its decision on a mere
difference in semantics.
C.

This Court Should Not Expand the Use of Extrinsic Evidence to
Include Determinations of Procedural Unconscionability.

Plaintiff argues that t;[t]he parol evidence rule does not apply to this case because
appellee has not attempted to 'vary' or 'add to' the terms of the arbitration agreement."
(PL's Br. at p. 18). Plaintiff also asserts that she "has never asked the Court to alter any
of the contract's unambiguous terms based on such outside-of-the-contract evidence."
{Id. at 19). Plaintiffs argument and assertions are simply wrong.2

2

Plaintiff also contends that because section 78B-3-421(l) "imposes requirements
that go beyond the common law of contracts." the parol evidence rule and any other
common law of contracts should not apply to preclude consideration of Plaintiff s
declarations because of a "conflict between the common law and a statute." (Pl/s Br. at
p. 18). Plaintiffs contention, however, is without merit. There is nothing in the language
of section 78B-3-421(l)-that allows for the use of extrinsic evidence to demonstrate
8

It is undisputable that Plaintiff submitted her declarations to contradict her
unambiguous acknowledgments in the Agreement that she: (1) received a written
explanation of the agreement; (2) had the right to ask questions and have them answered;
(3) received a copy of the Agreement; and (4) ultimately understood the terms of the
Agreement. {Compare R. 42 with Addendum B at Art. 9; see also PL's Br. at p. 14, fn. 1).
Indeed, the fundamental basis of the trial court's ruling is grounded in the contradictory
statements found in Plaintiffs declarations. {See R. 349-352). Plaintiff cannot now
escape the fact that based on her urging, the trial court relied on her impermissible
extrinsic evidence in rendering its decision.
Plaintiff also argues that the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Tangren Family
Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, 182 P.3d 326 stands for the proposition that "the parol
evidence rule does not prevent the Court from considering [extrinsic] evidence to
determine compliance with § 78B-3-421." (PL's Br. at pp. 19-20). Plaintiffs
interpretation of Tangren, however, is incorrect. In Tangren, the Supreme Court
expressly stated that "we will nevertheless allow extrinsic evidence in support of an
argument that the contract is not, in fact, valid/or certain reasons that we have
specified" Tangren, 2008 UT 20 at If 15 (emphasis added). The Court went on to specify
the reasons when parol evidence will be allowed: "where the contract is alleged to be a

compliance or non-compliance with its requirements. Thus, there is no conflict between
the parol evidence rule—or any other common law of contracts—and the language of the
statute giving rise to a statutory preemption of the common law of contracts.
9

forger}7, a joke, a sham, lacking in consideration, or w7here a contract is voidable for fraud,
duress, mistake, or illegality/' Id. In the instant case, Plaintiff has not asserted that the
Agreement is a forgery, a joke, a sham, lacking in consideration, or is voidable for fraud,
duress, mistake, or illegality. (See R.; see also Pl/s Br.) Rather, Plaintiff argues that her
declarations should be considered to determine whether Dr. Bova complied with the
requirements of § 78B-3-421(l). (See PL's Br. at pp. 19-20). Plaintiff s stated use
of—and the trial court's reliance on—her declarations is not one of the several reasons
specified by the Tangren court which allow for the use of extrinsic evidence. See
Tangren, 2008 UT 20 at f 15. Accordingly, the trial court erred in relying on Plaintiffs
declarations to find that the Agreement was not validly executed.
Plaintiff has failed to cite to any relevant authority which holds that extrinsic
evidence can be used to contradict express unambiguous acknowledgments in a contract
in an effort to demonstrate procedural unconscionability. (See R. 349-352; PL's Br.)
That is because no such authority exists. Indeed, what Plaintiff is asking this Court to do
is expand the use of extrinsic evidence to include determinations of whether the execution
of an unambiguous contract was procedurally unconscionable. (See Pi's Br. at pp. 18-21).
This would, of course, mean that every party to a contract could challenge the validity of
the contract by simply submitting an after-the-fact declaration or affidavit that contradicts
unambiguous and express language indicating that they understood the terms of the
contract. This undesirable result is precluded not only by well-established precedent
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regarding the application of the parol evidence rule, but by fundamental principles of
contract law. See Western Properties v. Southern Utah Aviation, Inc. 116 P.2d 656, 658
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (holding %;a signatory cannot, with hindsight, claim ignorance of the
contract and thereby escape liability"); Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch &
Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1047 (Utah 1985) (holding u[e]ach party has the burden to
understand the terms of a contract before he affixes his signature to it and may not
thereafter assert his ignorance as a defense"); C J.S. Contracts § 705 (2010) (stating "a
person who signs a contract must be presumed to have read, understood and assented to it
. . . .and "[t]he fact that a contracting party fails to read papers or does not have someone
else read them to him or her does not rebut the presumption*').
II.

PLAINTIFF'S INTERPRETATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 78H-J-42 I IS
UNTENABLE AND WOULD RESULT IN UNACCEPTABLE
CONSEQUENCES.
Plaintiff argues that Defendants must prove through extrinsic evidence that

Plaintiff was verbally encouraged to read the Arbitration Agreement and ask questions.
Yet, other than the suggestion that Dr. Bova could have filed an affidavit, neither the trial
court nor Plaintiff have explained how Dr. Bova could have, or should have, proved
verbal encouragement. In her brief, Plaintiff carefully avoids any discussion of the
practical consequences of her interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421. Without
further explanation or practical discussion, Plaintiff states that 'there is nothing
difficult—let alone impossible—about proving compliance with § 78B-3-421." (See PL's
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Br. at p. 23.) However, taken to its logical conclusion, Plaintiffs interpretation of
section 78B-3-421 would unavoidably lead to factual disputes which legislature sought to
avoid and, ultimately, to far fewer arbitrations.
In Utah, statutes must be "interpreted in a reasonable way, with an eye toward the
construction that will achieve the best results in practical application, will avoid
unacceptable consequences, and will be consistent with sound public policy." Derbridge
v. Mutual Protective Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)(internal citations
and quotations omitted). See also Wasatch County v. Tax Com 'n, 2009 UT App. 221,
^[ 13, 217 P.3d 270 (noting that statutes should be interpreted with any eye toward "the
effect it will have in practical application55). In other wrords, Utah courts "interpret a
statute to avoid absurd consequences," State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108 at \ 12, 992 P.2d 986,
and to arrive at "a reasonable and sensible construction." State v. Garcia, 965 P.2d 508,
512 (Utah Ct.App. 1998) (quoting Statev. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d310, 313 (Utah 1988)).
In this case, neither the Plaintiff nor the trial court explain how a medical provider
can sufficiently prove verbal encouragement through extrinsic evidence. Plaintiff vaguely
argues that "[hjealthcare providers seeking to enforce arbitration agreements subject to
§ 78B-3-421 have access to all of the standard tools and methods that parties use to prove
facts in court."* {See Pl/s Br. at p. 23.) Plaintiff does not however, provide a single
example of such "methods."
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The most obvious form of evidence to prove verbal encouragement would be the
arbitration agreement itself.3 However, under the reasoning of Plaintiff and the trial
court, the arbitration agreement no matter how detailed would be insufficient to prove
verbal encouragement. Extrinsic evidence would always be necessary. For example, at
the trial court hearing on this issue, the following exchange occurred between defense
counsel and the court:
Hester: What we are talking about here is a woman who signed two
agreements that say the exact same thing, ostensibly in the presence of a
daughter who knew exactly what she was signing.
Judge: Legally that is insufficient because she was not verbally encouraged.
Hester: That's what I understand their position to be based on extrinsic
evidence only.
Judge: Well, how else can you do it other than by extrinsic evidence? If
you put a paragraph in the agreement that says I hereby concede that I was
verbally encouraged to read and ask, you put that as a clause in your
contract, they are going to say, well, I wasn't verbally encouraged and I
wasn't verbally told and I didn't read this.
[R. 231]. Thus, under the Trial Court's analysis, health care providers could never prove
verbal encouragement through the arbitration agreement or any other writing because the
patient could simply claim that she never read it.
As Defendants explained in their initial brief, absent a recording of the
conversation, there is no way to positively prove that "verbal encouragement*' occurred.

3

For example, in this case, the Plaintiff affirmed that she "received a written
explanation of the terms of this Agreement understood the terms and "had the right to ask
questions and have my questions answered/* (See Pl/s Br.; Addendum B to Dr. Bova's
Opening Brief at Art. 9)
13

Given that a written acknowledgment is insufficient and a recording is not feasible, the
only evidence a health care provider could possibly offer is an affidavit. The affidavit
could state that the health care provider remembers verbally encouraging the patient to
read and ask questions regarding the arbitration agreement. However, given the amount
of patients that health care providers treat, it is more likely that the affidavit would simply
state that it is his policy or practice to provide such verbal encouragement. This affidavit
would then be weighed against the patient's affidavit creating either a jury question or, if
allowed, a evidentiary hearing in which the trial court would be forced to weigh the
credibility of dueling affidavits. This result was certainly not anticipated or intended by
the legislature.
It is clear from the language of section 78B-3-421 that the legislature intended to
avoid this type of factual dispute. For example, Utah Code Ann. section 78B-3-421
specifies mandatory agreement terms and includes the information that must be provided
to the patient regarding arbitration, how that information is to be provided to the patient,
and an acknowledgment by the patient that she received the information. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-3-421(l) (2008). If the arbitration agreement includes the information
specified in the statute, and the patient signs a written acknowledgment of having
received a written explanation of the agreement terms, then the patient is essentially
foreclosed from claiming ignorance of the agreement. In pertinent part, section 78B-3421(4) provides:

14

(4) A written acknowledgment of having received a written
explanation of a binding arbitration agreement signed by or on behalf
of the patient shall be a defense to a claim that the patient did not
receive a written explanation of the agreement as required by
Subsection (1) unless the patient:
(a) proves that the person who signed the agreement lacked the
capacity to do so; or
(b) shows by clear and convincing evidence that the execution
of the agreement was induced by the health care provider's
affirmative acts of fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent
omission to state material facts.
The statute is designed to prevent patients from nullifying valid agreements through
claims of ignorance. The legislature clearly intended to avoid factual disputes regarding
the enforceability of arbitration agreements. Given how carefully the legislature sought to
avoid factual disputes regarding the written agreement, it seems inconceivable that the
legislature intended to create factual disputes regarding "verbal encouragement."
Moreover, under Utah law, it is unclear whether it is even the trial court's role to
weigh the credibility of evidence to determine the enforceability of an arbitration
agreement. Generally, it is not a trial court's duty to weigh contravening evidence; this
task is exclusively reserved for a jury. See e.g. Winters v. W.S. Hatch Co., Inc., 546 P.2d
603, 605 (Utah 1976) ("The court is not free to weigh the evidence, and the weight of the
evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are within the jury's sole province.")
Indeed, in this case the trial court expressed serious reservations about the prospect of
having to weigh evidence. The trial court expressly stated that it did not know whether it

15

was the duty of the judge or the jury to weigh the credibility of evidence where the issue
is the enforceability of an arbitration agreement. (R.228-29.)
If it is the jury's role to weigh the credibility of evidence in a dispute over the
enforceability of an arbitration agreement, then the entire purpose of arbitration would be
frustrated. The principle purpose of arbitration is to avoid the time and expense of trial.
This purpose is obviously nullified if a jury must be called to determine whether or not an
arbitration agreement is even enforceable in the first place. Additionally, even if the trial
court may appropriately weigh the credibility7 of evidence in this circumstance, the
purpose of arbitration is still undermined. Months of briefing, affidavits and memoranda,
to ultimately have the issue decided at an evidentiary hearing is both time-consuming and
costly. In other words, the inevitable factual dispute that would arise from the trial
court's analysis of the statute would undermine the purpose of arbitration.4
CONCLUSION
The April 16th Agreement is valid and enforceable under both Utah statutory
mandate, and Utah contract law. Plaintiffs unambiguous acknowledgments clearly
demonstrate that she understood the terms of the Agreement negating her claims of
procedural unconscionability. The trial court's strict interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §
78B-3-421 undermines the purpose of the statute and the Utah Healthcare Malpractice

4

This also undermines the purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. See
Utah Code Ann. 78B-3-402.
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Act and makes "verbally encouragement" all but impossible to prove. Accordingly, this
Court should reverse the trial court and order Plaintiff to arbitrate her claims pursuant to
the terms of the April 16th Agreement.
Respectfully submitted this ^J) day of September, 2010.
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